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 NASA STI Program . . . in Profile 
 
Since its founding, NASA has been dedicated to the 
advancement of aeronautics and space science. The 
NASA scientific and technical information (STI) 
program plays a key part in helping NASA maintain 
this important role. 
 
The NASA STI program operates under the 
auspices of the Agency Chief Information Officer. 
It collects, organizes, provides for archiving, and 
disseminates NASA’s STI. The NASA STI 
program provides access to the NASA Aeronautics 
and Space Database and its public interface, the 
NASA Technical Report Server, thus providing one 
of the largest collections of aeronautical and space 
science STI in the world. Results are published in 
both non-NASA channels and by NASA in the 
NASA STI Report Series, which includes the 
following report types: 
 
 
 TECHNICAL PUBLICATION. Reports of 
completed research or a major significant phase 
of research that present the results of NASA 
Programs and include extensive data or 
theoretical analysis. Includes compilations of 
significant scientific and technical data and 
information deemed to be of continuing 
reference value. NASA counterpart of peer-
reviewed formal professional papers, but 
having less stringent limitations on manuscript 
length and extent of graphic presentations. 
 
 TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM. Scientific 
and technical findings that are preliminary or of 
specialized interest, e.g., quick release reports, 
working papers, and bibliographies that contain 
minimal annotation. Does not contain extensive 
analysis. 
 
 CONTRACTOR REPORT. Scientific and 
technical findings by NASA-sponsored 
contractors and grantees. 
 
 
 
 CONFERENCE PUBLICATION.  
Collected papers from scientific and 
technical conferences, symposia, seminars, 
or other meetings sponsored or co-
sponsored by NASA. 
 
 SPECIAL PUBLICATION. Scientific, 
technical, or historical information from 
NASA programs, projects, and missions, 
often concerned with subjects having 
substantial public interest. 
 
 TECHNICAL TRANSLATION.  
English-language translations of foreign 
scientific and technical material pertinent to 
NASA’s mission. 
 
Specialized services also include organizing  
and publishing research results, distributing 
specialized research announcements and feeds, 
providing information desk and personal search 
support, and enabling data exchange services. 
 
For more information about the NASA STI 
program, see the following: 
 
 Access the NASA STI program home page 
at http://www.sti.nasa.gov 
 
 E-mail your question to help@sti.nasa.gov 
 
 Fax your question to the NASA STI 
Information  Desk at 443-757-5803 
 
 Phone the NASA STI Information Desk at  
443-757-5802 
 
 Write to: 
           STI Information Desk 
           NASA Center for AeroSpace Information 
           7115 Standard Drive 
           Hanover, MD 21076-1320 
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1 Introduction 
In the Decadal Survey of Civil Aeronautics: Foundation for the Future [1] the National Research 
Council has identified intelligent and adaptive systems as one of the five common threads for the 
“51 high-priority R&T challenges”. The report has explicitly identified adaptive systems (AS) 
technologies to be the key enabler for intelligent flight controls, advanced guidance and adaptive 
air traffic management (ATM) systems and for health management techniques to extend life and 
improve maintenance. 
Adaptive flight and engine controls systems have been researched for decades. The main 
attraction for adaptive systems is to detect, anticipate and prevent failures and reconfigure the 
aircraft displays/controls/engine operations in response. Adaptive systems can detect the 
degradation in performance due to failure or damage. An effective way of adaptation is through 
intelligent utilization of dynamic system identification and learning systems. System 
identification and learning is used to update the on-board aircraft process model and the control 
laws to adapt the system behavior and so continue to effectively control the aircraft. This 
increases time on wing, improve readiness and reduce operating costs.  
Another push for use of adaptive systems is coming from the growth in US air transport system 
capacity. The US air transportation system is expected to grow to double or triple the current size 
through the 2025 time frame; there is concern that the current ATM systems are not flexible 
enough to handle that growth. To meet the need for increased capacity and efficiency while 
maintaining operational safety, new technologies, processes and innovations must be 
implemented. These innovations provide for reduced separation and support transition from 
traditional, rules-based operations to performance-based ones. In light of the changes anticipated 
in NextGen ATM there is a renewed push on adaptive systems research. The adaptive guidance 
and control systems also enable the safe operation of both piloted and unmanned aircraft under 
various environmental disturbances. They minimize the impact of uncertainty (due to weather) 
and failure conditions.  
Finally adaptive systems are being proposed for management of human machine interactions on 
aircraft and ATM systems to mitigate the safety incidents due to failures at the human machine 
interface. In this case the emphasis is on the system behavior that adapts to the current context 
(tasks, user state, system configuration, environmental states, and so on). Also, some methods of 
assessing context may utilize a learning methodology. So for instance, using 
electroencephalogram (EEG) data to feed a system to assess the current cognitive state of a user 
may require training data so the system can learn what high and low workload looks like.  
There are two fundamental questions that need to be addressed for all the adaptive systems 
namely; when to adapt and how to adapt? Answering these questions when performing 
verification of the adaptive systems behavior can lead an unbounded increase of verification 
cases. The real challenge is to show that the system behavior is bounded, correct and accurate 
under all inputs. The new capabilities that adaptive systems offer can only be realized if an 
acceptable methodology can be found for certifying them within the context of the current Code 
of Federal Regulations (CFRs), associated advisory materials and industry standards. This work 
will provide suggestions for advanced design and safety assurance methodologies and techniques 
and the associated guidance that would address the current roadblocks. The techniques suggested 
are likely to be applicable to conventional systems as well and may provide ways in which the 
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DO-178B [2] design assurance burden can be reduced by focusing on the safety related 
requirements and providing more automated methods for development of verification evidence. 
Adaptive systems are perceived to be particularly difficult to certify because by definition they 
change their software defined parameters whilst in operation in response to the experienced time 
varying operating environment. Complying with the objectives and requirements of DO-178B is 
apparently problematic since DO-178B (and its successor DO-178C [3]) were conceived with an 
implicit assumption of time-invariant software parameters. One objective of this program was to 
show whether an adaptive system could be certified within the current regulatory framework, or 
if not, suggest changes to the framework that would allow for certification whilst preserving the 
essential features of safety in the final product. 
We first review the current certification framework and the recent changes it has undergone and 
then describe our suggested approach to design and certification methodology and framework 
that could result in successful progression through this framework. 
Much of what follows is applicable to DO-178C also and in fact we will show that the new 
supplements added to DO-178C are in fact essential components of a successful certification of 
an adaptive system. 
2 Current Certification Guidance and Standards 
We first discuss the current certification framework since we would like to determine whether or 
not adaptive systems could be certified within it as is, if some changes would be needed and if 
so, what those changes are recommended to be. 
This framework is built around CFR Title 14 (hereafter 14CFR) requirements. Figure 1 shows 
the general process flow and the applicable de-facto standards of current certification practice. 
These standards relate to1) system development, 2) safety assessment and 3) design assurance of 
system hardware and software. Details of all activities and deliverables to be fully compliant are 
not shown in interest of focusing on the key steps; these can be found within the documents 
referenced. The scope here is to give an overview and not a full descriptive narrative. We do not 
discuss DO-254 [4] since this is not within the scope of the present program and is in any case 
limited in application to programmable devices and not to hardware generally [5, 6]. Similarly, 
SAE ARP-5150 [7] provides guidance for assessing ongoing safety during commercial 
operations but we do not discuss this aspect here. 
In each case there is a direct equivalence between US and European editions of these documents. 
These are denoted by SAE/RTCA document numbers and corresponding European (published by 
EuroCAE) documents numbers. We refer only to the US editions here for brevity. 
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Figure 1 – Certification Process Flow and Applicable Standards 
2.1 ARP-4754A Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems 
The original version of ARP-4754 [8] has been in use for 15 years. The development of ARP-
4754A started in 2003 by the SAE S-18 Committee and was published in 2010. It now has a new 
title “Guidelines for development of civil aircraft and systems” (old title: Certification 
considerations for highly-integrated or complex aircraft systems). ARP-4754A discusses the 
certification aspects of systems installed on aircraft, taking into account the overall aircraft 
operating environment and functions. To quote from ARP-4754A; 
“This document discusses the development of aircraft systems taking into account the overall aircraft operating 
environment and functions. This includes validation of requirements and verification of the design implementation 
for certification and product assurance. It provides practices for showing compliance with the regulations and serves 
to assist a company in developing and meeting its own internal standards by considering the guidelines herein. 
The guidelines in this document were developed in the context of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14CFR) 
Part 25 and European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Certification Specification (CS) CS-25. It may be applicable 
to other regulations, such as Parts 23, 27, 29, 33, and 35 (CS-23, CS-27, CS-29, CS-E, CS-P). 
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This document addresses the development cycle for aircraft and systems that implement aircraft functions. It does 
not include specific coverage of detailed software or electronic hardware development, safety assessment processes, 
in-service safety activities, aircraft structural development nor does it address the development of the Master 
Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) or Configuration Deviation List (CDL). More detailed coverage of the software 
aspects of development are found in RTCA document DO-178B, “Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and 
Equipment Certification” and its EUROCAE counterpart, ED-12B. Coverage of electronic hardware aspects of 
development are found in RTCA document DO-254/EUROCAE ED-80, “Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne 
Electronic Hardware”. Design guidance and certification considerations for integrated modular avionics are found in 
appropriate RTCA/EUROCAE document DO-297/ED-124. Methodologies for safety assessment processes are 
outlined in SAE document ARP4761, “Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on 
Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment”. Details for in-service safety assessment are found in ARP5150, “Safety 
Assessment of Transport Airplanes In Commercial Service” and ARP5151 Safety Assessment of General Aviation 
Airplanes and Rotorcraft In Commercial Service.“ Post-certification activities (modification to certificated product) 
are covered in section 6 of this document. The regulations and processes used to develop and approve the MMEL 
vary throughout the world. Guidance for the development of the MMEL should be sought from the local 
airworthiness authority.” 
Table 1 below shows the means by which ARP-4754A may be invoked for a particular 
certification project. ARP-4754A guidance may also be applicable to aircraft equipment certified 
to other 14CFR Parts such as Parts 23, 27, 29 and 33 so for brevity in what follows we discuss 
this in reference to Part 25. In this table, we use the term ‘invocation/policy’ to mean that the 
referenced document is recognized by the regulator as an acceptable means of compliance with 
the applicable 14CFR Part. 
The issuance of an advisory circular (AC) is a regulatory policy declaration that an applicant’s 
compliance thereto is one, but not the only, acceptable means of showing compliance to the 
referenced Part of 14CFR. Compliance is recommended but is not mandatory. Compliance to 
ARP-4754A may also be required by the certification authority through the issue of a project 
specific Issue Paper (FAA, IP) or Certification Review Item (EASA, CRI). Final regulatory 
approval of all systems is assumed to be accomplished through or within a Technical Standards 
Order (TSO), Type Certificate (TC) or Supplementary Type Certificate (STC) certification 
project. 
Table 1 - ARP-4754A Invocation 
Reference Description Applicability Invocation 
ARP-4754A Guidelines for 
Development of Civil 
Aircraft and Systems 
Aircraft systems and equipment AC 20-174 [9], 
IP, CRI 
AC 25.1309-1A 
[10] 
Describes various 
acceptable means for 
showing compliance 
with the requirements 
of 14 CFR section 
25.1309(b), (c), and 
(d) 
Applies to any system on which 
compliance with any of those 
requirements is based. 
Section 25.1309(b) and (d) 
specifies required safety levels in 
qualitative terms, and requires 
that a safety assessment be made  
Policy 
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2.1.1 Recent Changes to ARP-4754 
ARP-4754A has had substantial updates relative to its predecessor. We summarize the major 
changes below. This summary is based on unpublished presentations given at an S-18 WG-63 
sub-committee meeting in Miami, January 2011. 
• (+) Reinforces Development aspects (not only for Certification). 
• (-) Highly-integrated or complex systems notion lost (in the title) because ambiguous. 
The guidelines are primarily directed toward systems that support aircraft level function. 
Typically, these systems involve significant interactions with other systems in a larger integrated 
environment. The contents are recommended practices and should not be construed to be 
regulatory requirement. It is recognized that alternative methods to the processes described or 
referenced may be available to an applicant desiring to obtain certification. A conceptual 
mapping of the old and new sections is shown below. 
 
Figure 2 – ARP-4754 – ARP-4754A Sections Mapping 
The major changes and new content can be summarized as: 
Section 1 – Scope 
Section 2 – References
Section 3 – System Development 
Section 4 – Certification Process
Section 5 – Design Assurance 
Level 
Section 6 – Safety Assessment 
Process
Section 7 – Validation
Section 8 – Verification
Section 9 – Configuration 
Management
Section 10 – Process Assurance
Section 11 – Modified Aircraft
Section 1 – Scope 
Section 2 – References
Section 3 – Development Planning
Section 4 – Aircraft and System 
Development process
Section 5 – integral Processes
Section 6 – Modifications to Aircraft 
Systems
Appendix A – Process Objectives 
Data
Appendix B – Safety Program Plan
Appendix C – FDAL/IDAL
Assignment Process Example
Appendix D – Deleted
Appendix (Example) – Deleted   
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Figure 3 – In/Out Mapping of ARP-4754 and ARP-4754A 
Section 1 - Scope 
• A paragraph has been deleted with reference to the precedence of this document in the 
event of conflict between the text of this document and the text of DO-178B 
• All the information concerning highly integrated or complex systems has been deleted  
Section 2 – References 
• Applicable documents -> Relationship between American/European standards 
• Definitions 
• Abbreviations and acronyms 
Section 3 - Development Planning 
• Life cycle process checkpoints and reviews  
• Maturity expectations  
• Transition Criteria (i.e. life cycle process checkpoints and reviews, which are aligned with 
program phases and gates)  
• Management of deviations from plans  
Section 4 - Aircraft and system development process 
• Identification of Aircraft-Level Functions, Function Requirements and Function Interfaces  
• Relationship between Requirement Levels, Function Development Assurance Level 
(FDAL) and Item Development Assurance Level (IDAL)  
• The objectives for accomplishment of FDAL and IDAL (i.e. ARP4754A Appendix A, DO-
254/ED-80 and DO-178B/ED-12)  
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Section 5.1 – Safety Assessment 
• Safety Case / Safety Synthesis 
• Safety Program Plan 
• Preliminary Aircraft Safety Assessment (PASA)  
• Aircraft Safety Assessment (ASA) 
Section 5.2 – Development Assurance Level Assignment 
• DAL assignment based on failure condition (FC) severity classification and  independence 
attributes (no more based on type of architectures) 
• Two different DAL: FDAL that apply to function requirement development and IDAL that 
apply to item (Hardware/Software) development 
• Concept of Functional Failure Sets (FFS) 
• New Table 5-2 “Development Assurance Level Assignment to Members of a Functional 
Failure Set” with two assignment options 
• FDAL Assignment Taking Credit for External Events 
Section 5.3 - Requirements Capture 
• Re-use of Existing Certified Systems and Items. The requirements to which the system or 
Item was certified should be validated according to the new application and modified as 
necessary 
• Deriving Safety-related Requirements from the Safety Analyses  
Section 5.4 - Requirements Validation 
• Definition of correctness and completeness improved 
• Validation Rigor improved with the concept of independence in the validation process 
• The application of independence in the validation process is dependent upon the 
development assurance level 
• The validation plan should include a description of the validation activities to which 
independence is applied 
• Independent review of requirement data and supporting rationale 
• The reviews should be documented including the review participants and their roles 
Section 5.5 - Implementation Verification 
• Identification of key verification activities and sequence of any dependent activities 
• Identification of the roles and responsibilities associated with conducting the verification 
activities and a description of independence between design and verification activities 
Section 5.6 - Configuration management 
• Two System Control Categories (see ARP-4754A Table 5-6) 
Section 5.7 – Process Assurance 
• The process assurance activities described are not intended to imply or impose specific 
organizational structures or responsibilities. However, process assurance should have a 
level of independence from the development process 
Section 5.8 – Certification Process 
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• Certification Planning: there may be a single certification plan for the project or a top-level 
plan for the aircraft and a set of related plans for each of the aircraft systems 
• Early coordination and approval of the plan is strongly encouraged 
Section 6 - Modification to Aircraft or Systems 
• Aviation Authority requirements and regulations categorize aircraft modifications into 
either “minor or major” changes 
• When a modification is proposed to an item, system or aircraft an initial impact analysis 
should be performed and should include an evaluation of the impact of the modification on 
the original safety assessments 
• The modification impact analysis should be confirmed or updated once verification 
activities have been completed.  Results of these analyses should be reflected in: 
o The appropriate certification documentation 
o The verification activities needed to assure that no adverse effects are introduced 
during the modification process 
o The modification summary in which the impact of the implemented modifications 
is confirmed 
Appendices 
• Appendix A – Process Objectives Data 
• Table A-1: Process Objectives, Outputs & System Control Category by function 
development assurance level (note: the scope and detail of the life cycle data varies 
depending on the FDAL assigned) 
• Appendix B – Safety Program Plan  
• Appendix C – FDAL/IDAL assignment example 
• Appendix D – deleted 
• Previous guidelines in this appendix have been superseded by the material found in section 
5.2 of ARP-4754A 
2.2 ARP-4761 Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment 
Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment  
The major guidance for civil airborne systems and equipment safety assessment is SAE ARP-
4761 [11]. This is commonly accepted by certification authorities and industry as an acceptable, 
but not the only, means of showing compliance to AC 25.1309. However it is not formally 
referenced or recognized in an issued AC. ARP-4761 describes guidelines and a variety of 
example probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods and techniques for performing the safety 
assessment of civil aircraft systems and equipment. SAE S-18 is currently updating this 
document with an expected release in 2014. 
2.3 Software Design Assurance 
The primary software design assurance guidance document is DO-178B. The table below shows 
how it is invoked by the current regulatory framework. 
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Table 2 - DO-178B Invocation 
Reference Description Applicability Invocation 
DO-178B Software 
Considerations in 
Airborne Systems 
and Equipment 
Certification 
Provides guidance for the 
production of software for 
airborne systems and equipment 
that performs its intended 
function with a level of 
confidence in safety that 
complies with airworthiness 
requirements 
TSO, AC 20-115B 
Order 8110.49, 
Change 1 
Software Approval 
Guidelines 
This order guides Aircraft 
Certification Service (AIR) 
field offices and Designated 
Engineering Representatives 
(DER) on how to apply 
RTCA/DO-178B, “Software 
Considerations in Airborne 
Systems and Equipment 
Certification,” for approving 
software used in airborne 
computers. 
Policy 
AC 20-115B Calls attention to 
RTCA DO-178B, 
“Software 
Considerations in 
Airborne Systems 
and Equipment 
Certification” 
Calls attention to RTCA DO- 
178B, “Software 
Considerations in Airborne 
Systems and Equipment 
Certification,” issued December 
1992. It discusses how the 
document may be applied with 
FAA technical standard order 
(TSO), authorizations, type 
certification (TC), or 
supplemental type certification 
authorization (STC). 
Policy 
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2.3.1 Recent Changes to DO-178B 
DO-178B has been revised to DO-178C by the joint RTCA SC-205/ EUROCAE WG-71 special 
committees. The following paragraphs summarize the major changes and rationale. DO-178B 
did not provide any specific guidance for the newer software technologies listed below. There 
are now 4 new supplements to provide this. DO-178C is not presently invoked by the 
certification authorities. 
2.3.1.1 Core Document 
In general the new revision makes only minor changes to the main body, largely to clarify some 
language which had caused confusion in the past. The changes to Section 6.0 were very limited. 
So there should be very little impact to the way verification is performed today.  However, there 
are some subtle changes that could impact projects that had interpreted DO-178B differently than 
intended.  In general, the language was improved and made more explicit.  There were also a few 
objectives added to explicitly call out what were sometimes called “hidden objectives” in DO-
178B.  The prime example is Section 6.4.4.2b of DO-178B that states that analysis was needed to 
compare source code to object code.  In the end only three objectives were added in Tables A-3 
through A-7. 
2.3.1.2 Model-Based Development (MBD) and Verification Supplement to DO-178C and 
DO-278A 
The goal of the MBD supplement RTCA DO-331 [12] is to provide guidance in an area where 
DO-178B is somewhat awkward to apply. The purpose of this supplement is (quoting from DO-
331); 
“This supplement contains modifications and additions to DO-178C objectives, activities, explanatory text, and 
software life cycle data that should be addressed when model-based development and verification are used as part of 
the software life cycle. This includes the artifacts that would be expressed using models and the verification 
evidence that could be derived from them. Therefore, this supplement also applies to the models developed in the 
system process that define software requirements or software architecture” 
Models may represent high-level requirements (specification model) or equivalently behavior or 
may express the internal architecture, data structures and flow control (design model) of a 
software function. Models may be loosely defined as any computer representation of a function. 
Underlying all models is a set of mathematical equations, logical expressions etc. describing the 
functional, logical and temporal relationships of inputs and outputs. These relationships may be 
encoded in a tool language (e.g. a Simulink or similar block) which is used by the tool (the 
simulation environment, e.g. an interpreter) to execute under planned test conditions to 
demonstrate the model behavior. 
This supplement treats the verification of models in the same way as DO-178C treats the 
verification of software. Models must be shown to be compliant with the stated model 
requirements by a combination of analysis, test and review, i.e. by satisfaction of the various 
DO-178C objectives. 
Executable object code can be produced automatically by some tools. When code is produced 
this way, it does not alleviate the necessity of demonstrating that the executable object code 
satisfies the usual and corresponding high and low-level requirements of DO-178C. The 
certification credit attainable from the use of MBD and automated code generators is dependent 
on the desired software assurance level and the tool qualification level (TQL) per DO-178C. 
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2.3.1.3 Object-Oriented Technology and Related Techniques (OOT&RT) Supplement to DO-
178C and DO-278A 
The basis for the OOT&RT supplement DO-332 [13] was the guidance previously provided in 
the OOTiA (Object-Oriented Technology in Aviation) handbook [14].  Verification of software 
written with OOT&RT methods is intended to be performed in the same way as any other type of 
software per DO-178C.  The supplement also addresses some verification challenges unique to 
OO, such as dynamic memory allocation. Quoting DO-332, the stated purpose is; 
“The purpose of this supplement is to provide guidance for the production of software using OOT&RT for systems 
and equipment that performs its intended function with a level of confidence in safety that complies with 
airworthiness requirements. This supplement contains modifications and additions to DO-178C objectives, 
activities, explanatory text, and software life cycle data that should be addressed when OOT&RT are used as part of 
the software life cycle.” 
2.3.1.4 Formal Methods (FM) Supplement to DO-178C and DO-278A 
The formal methods supplement DO-333 [15] introduces the concept of “formal analysis.”  The 
basic concept is that if FM is applied in a development program, then some credit can be taken 
toward some of the DO-178C verification objectives by performing formal analysis.  Quoting 
DO-333, the stated purpose is; 
“This supplement identifies the modifications and additions to DO-178C objectives, activities, explanatory text, and 
software life cycle data that should be addressed when formal methods are used as part of the software life cycle. 
This includes the artifacts that would be expressed using some formal notation and the verification evidence that 
could be derived from them.” 
As is well known testing has fundamental limitations of coverage. The theory is that by using 
formal proofs of behavior, we are able to verify the system more thoroughly than using 
traditional testing means. FM can prove that system functional and safety properties are satisfied 
under all conditions; criteria that would be infeasible or very difficult to prove through testing 
alone. Testing cannot be completely eliminated, but it could be reduced.  
FM utilizes formal models that are operated on by a formal analysis tool. The tool must be 
assessed according to the DO-178C tool qualification supplement DO-330 [16]. FM are strongly 
linked to the MBD supplement described above with the emphasis being on mathematical 
models that have a precisely defined syntax and semantics e.g. mathematical notations such as 
logic, sets, differential equations or ADA and C subsets. Formal models need to be developed 
according to those guidelines. 
2.3.1.5 Software Tool Qualification Considerations 
DO-178C retains the tool types of DO-178B and adds one additional type. These tool types are 
now defined in terms of 3 criteria. The carried over tool types are those that could inject an error 
(development tools, Criteria 1) and those that could fail to detect an error (verification tools, 
Criteria 3). The additional type (Criteria 2) is a subset of verification tools. The criteria are now 
defined as below. 
• Criteria 1: A tool whose output is part of the airborne software and thus could insert an 
error 
• Criteria 2: A tool that automates verification process(es) and thus could fail to detect an 
error, and whose output is used to justify the elimination or reduction of: 
o Verification process(es) other than that automated by the tool, or 
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o Development process(es) that could have an impact on the airborne software 
• Criteria 3: A tool that, within the scope of its intended use, could fail to detect an error 
In addition a new table is given in DO-178C that relates the software assurance level, the tool 
type (i.e. the above criteria) and a TQL designator, TQL1-5 where TQL1 is the most rigorous 
level applying to Criteria 1 tools used for DAL-A software. DO-330 defines tool qualification 
objectives and provides guidance on the activities necessary to satisfy the objectives according to 
the TQL designation. Broadly these are the same objectives and activities that are defined for 
operational software in DO-178C. 
3 Adaptive System Types and Architectures 
Adaptive systems are a broad category of systems with many application domains and a variety 
of adaptation methods. We have categorized them in the taxonomy of Figure 4 below. 
 
Figure 4 – Adaptive System Taxonomy 
An AS typically incorporates a reference model of the desired response and a learning 
mechanism that adjusts the AS control parameters in response to measured changes in the 
external environment. The control objective is to adjust parameters so that the actual 
performance matches the desired. The learning mechanism may take several forms e.g. neural or 
radial basis function network, reflection/autonomic (dynamic code assignment or self-modifying 
code) and genetic update (random mutation and fitness selection). More details of these and 
references are provided in a predecessor NASA study [17] which we incorporate by reference. 
Objective for AS
Adaptation Type
Technical Objective
Controls
On-board
Off-board
Monitoring
Health
Planning/Airspace
Environment/Disturbance
Control Reallocation
Parameter Identification
Structure Identification
Trajectory Generation/Route Planning
Change in Parameters, Constraints
Adaptation Method
Supervised
Unsupervised
Reinforcement
Bounded
Unbounded
Continuous
Triggered
Planning
What
When &
Where
How
Optimization
characteristics/property
location
adaptation 
frequency
Regulatory Considerations for Adaptive Systems Page 13 
Because of the wide variety of AS, we have focused our efforts on a particular adaptive system 
type. We defined a specific set of AS features and constraints to be more specific in our 
conclusions and recommendations. These are indicated by the red circles above. We selected a 
controls type of application (e.g. a flight controller that continuously monitors the environment 
(parameter identification), is on-board the aircraft (i.e. parameter updates are calculated locally 
not uplinked from a ground facility) and uses supervised learning to perform the parameter 
update. This choice was guided by two considerations; 
First, adaptive control has been in use since at least the 1960s and has been the subject of much 
research and several military applications. Some examples are given below. 
• NASA/USAF F-111 Mission Adaptive Wing [18] 
• Boeing is using adaptive control for production JDAM 
• NASA has been using the L1 adaptive control for research with an unmanned model of a 
small scale commercial aircraft [19]  
• Rockwell Collins (formerly Athena) has demonstrated the Automatic Supervisory Adaptive 
Control (ASAC) on an unmanned small scale F/A-18 [20] 
• Honeywell/AFRL Integrated Adaptive Guidance & Control For Future Responsive Access 
To Space Technology (FAST) [21] 
We are not aware of the use of adaptive control in any commercial aircraft. 
Secondly, we had tentatively concluded that to assure the safety of an airborne AS it would 1) be 
necessary to impose some system level features and constraints and 2) be of a type that could be 
feasibly and accurately represented by a computer model of a type amenable to automated 
analysis. We will discuss these aspects later in this report. These self-imposed requirements 
excluded the genetic algorithm and reflection/autonomic types of learning since they appeared to 
present extreme modeling difficulty. We did not consider controllers of the gain scheduled type 
since the adaptation is limited to a few pre-determined states and can therefore be verified using 
the standard methods of DO-178B/C. In a similar vein we did not consider an AS that is pre-
trained offline and thereafter remains in a fixed configuration. 
We therefore constructed a representative adaptive system architecture exemplar that generalizes 
the above examples and meets our imposed requirements to use in our analysis of verifiability 
per DO-178B/C. A block diagram is shown in Figure 5. This is a triggered system that uses an 
expected response model to update its operating parameters. The updated values are used when 
triggered by a signal, e.g. by pilot command or vehicle health management (VHM) system acting 
as an observer of various related aircraft components such as sensors, hydraulics, actuators, 
control surfaces etc., or the occurrence of a failure or off-nominal condition. It otherwise remains 
in a fixed/static configuration. 
We set 2 major safety requirements; 1) that parameter adjustment be constrained to pre-
determined ranges that guarantee stability and controllability (e.g. in the Lyapunov criteria sense) 
and 2) that the control error signal converges asymptotically to the neighborhood of zero, within 
an arbitrarily small bound, in finite time. These latter seem to be essential features of a certifiable 
flight control system whether adaptive or not. 
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Figure 5 – Exemplar Flight Control Architecture 
4 Adaptive System Certification 
We now discuss adaptive system certification in the context of the selected adaptive system 
controller example and the current certification framework described above. 
4.1 Concerns on the Feasibility of Applying DO-178B to Software Design 
Assurance of Adaptive Systems 
All adaptive systems embody a learning sub-system of some type and some embedded model of 
the desired system performance. The learning sub-system changes the system operating 
parameters (e.g. control gain) in response to measurements taken on the external environment. 
The objective is that the actual performance closely matches the desired performance represented 
in the model. Non-adaptive (fixed configuration) systems assume the external environment 
remains constant. The external environment includes the sensors providing the inputs and 
actuators operating control surfaces. There may be several parameters that adjust value over time 
through the learning function. These will, in general, be real-valued variables. This means that an 
adaptive system has an infinite set of possible parameter values even if the allowable range is 
constrained. This immediately leads to difficulties since it is infeasible to show by test (as DO-
178B is conventionally interpreted) that in the implemented system, all system requirements are 
satisfied under all possible parameter values. Secondly it is difficult to establish what the 
expected output from a test should be since the exact system state has evolved through learning, 
is unobservable and therefore unknown. These difficulties are explained at length in Jacklin [22, 
23] and Schumann [24]. Our objective in this work therefore is to find ways in which these 
difficulties can be overcome. 
4.2 Suggested Approach to Software Design Assurance of Adaptive Systems 
In other works (e.g. [22]), the problem has been stated in terms of ‘what methods could be 
applied to comply with the assurance standards for software of DO-178B?’ and ‘what changes or 
System Identification
Regulatory Considerations for Adaptive Systems Page 15 
additions to DO-178B would be necessary to permit compliance?’. We suggest that the answers 
to these questions can best be arrived at by considering the methods by which we can write 
validated, verifiable HLR for adaptive systems. With this approach, the software assurance 
problem becomes more tractable since DO-178B/C defines a process to verify that operational 
code meets the previously stated and assumed to be correct and complete requirements as 
provided by the systems and safety development processes.  
We suggest that DO-178B alone cannot provide adequate software design assurance but that 
DO-178C and supplements offers a promising avenue to accomplish adequate software design 
assurance if they are preceded by rigorous system design activities that generate validated and 
verifiable design constraints and requirements. This is largely because DO-178C and 
supplements offers a well defined methodology to partially shift the software design assurance 
burden from test to analysis. We have therefore considered the means and methods by which an 
applicant can derive and validate a complete and consistent set of verifiable adaptive system 
requirements expressed in formal or mathematical terms with well defined syntax and semantics 
that are amenable to modern analysis methods capable of providing a high level of design 
assurance. 
We begin by asserting the following principles; 
• Software design assurance alone is inadequate to assure the safe application of adaptive 
systems 
• System safety objectives must be defined and captured. These form the basis of an 
unambiguous safety case 
• The adaptive system must, by design, exhibit certain functional and safety properties to 
ensure an acceptable level of safety. These properties need to be established and captured 
as part of the system requirements capture process 
• System level validation of the system properties is necessary to assure safe operation 
We suggest that some of the newer techniques incorporated in DO-178C and the associated 
supplements augmented by system level considerations offer a possible means to overcome the 
difficulties of AS software design assurance. More specifically, we suggest that; 
• More reliance be placed on verification by analysis or simulation rather than test 
• Multi-layered verification methods involving a judicious combination of test, analysis and 
simulation of models should be used 
• MBD techniques to capture system behavior in an analyzable form should be used 
• FM analysis techniques should be used because the learned state space is too rich for test 
alone to provide adequate assurance and to predict expected test results 
• Improved system safety analysis techniques should be used to derive system safety 
properties and that those properties be expressed in mathematical notations that are 
amenable to verification by FM 
In addition, to make the verification effort manageable, techniques analogous to ‘equivalency 
classes’ to subdivide the learned state space and to ‘structural coverage’ analysis to measure the 
verification completeness of the learned state space are needed to complete the approach. 
Currently these are not known. 
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4.3 System Level Approaches to the Certification of Adaptive Systems 
In view of the difficulties of showing software design assurance of AS by following only the 
processes of DO-178C we conclude that to assure the safe use of adaptive systems, additional 
prior work must be accomplished at the system level with the imposition of certain constraints on 
the architecture and permitted adaptation. The constraints result in the construction of desired 
system safety properties and requirements which, when verified, assure that the AS provides an 
acceptable level of safety. The system high level requirements (HLR) are thus established as part 
of the system design and safety processes of ARP-4754A and ARP-4761 through the 
construction of system functional and safety requirements. These properties must be written such 
that; 
• The system-level HLR fully express the necessary system properties 
• They are verifiable by one of the means identified in DO-178C and supplements 
The system properties are then verifiable by formal or other methods, so that objective proof of 
conformance can be established. In our analysis of problematic DO-178C objectives, we make 
use of the system properties that exist as a consequence of satisfying the AS safety objectives. 
The definition of requirement given in ARP-4744A implies that requirements are valid only if 
there are means by which they can be verified. Therefore requirements generation must be 
cognizant of the expected verification methods. Derived requirements, which develop throughout 
the development phase, should be fed back to the system and safety processes for validation. 
This is necessarily an iterative process because there are no known stopping criteria that can 
reliably determine completeness. 
4.4 Defining the System Level Characteristics of an Adaptive System 
In order to concretize our analysis, we have utilized the example architecture diagram of our 
target (Section 3) to define some of its salient system-level characteristics in terms of the system-
level design and safety objectives that we consider essential to enable compliance with the 
objectives of DO-178B/C and other airworthiness standards. 
These characteristics are inputs to the requirements generation process to be followed by the 
implementation activity. In our analysis of challenging DO-178B/C objectives, we make use of 
the system properties that exist as a consequence of satisfying these adaptive system safety 
objectives. The first step in our process is to define the "system safety objectives" that must be 
satisfied as part of systems requirements, design and verification and validation (V&V) 
processes. These are shown in Table 3 below.  
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  Table 3 - System Safety Objectives for Adaptive Systems (developed with exemplar adaptive 
flight control system in mind) 
 AS System Safety 
Objectives 
Activities and Techniques for Satisfying the Objective 
1 Assure adaptive 
algorithm stability & 
convergence 
 
(To be satisfied 
during development) 
Activities 
• The following activities apply to both the adaptive system and 
the closed loop system: 
• Develop system level requirements to ensure stability & 
convergence 
• Define stability & convergence assumptions (e.g. linear plant 
dynamics, continuous time implementation) 
• Define stability & convergence constraints (e.g. operating 
condition (input space) limitations, learned state space 
limitations, maximum convergence time) 
• Define computational resource usage constraints 
• Define engagement/disengagement criteria with transient 
suppression 
• Define runtime monitors for detection of: 
 Violation of assumptions or constraints 
 Loss of stability or convergence 
 Excessive usage of computational resources 
• Develop system level requirements that specify recovery 
behavior in the event of monitor alarm 
• Validate system requirements 
• Validate assumptions and constraints 
 
Techniques 
• Use of analytical models in combination with formal methods 
and automated tools to: 
 Specify mathematically rigorous system requirements and 
design 
 Develop proofs of stability & convergence (e.g., Lyapunov 
stability proof) 
 Validate system requirements 
 Generate expected results for requirements based testing 
 Determine optimal adaption gains to balance stability vs. 
convergence time 
 Perform automated synthesis of real-time monitors (Runtime 
Verification) 
• Use adaptive controller designs with proven stability and 
convergence properties (e.g. L-1 adaptive control) 
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2 Assure adaptive 
algorithm stability & 
convergence are 
satisfied 
 
(To be satisfied 
during real-time 
operation consistent 
with Rushby [25, 
26]) 
Activities 
• Development activities for this system objective are covered in 
row 1 above 
 
Techniques 
•  Confidence tool (confidence measure of NN weight 
convergence) 
•  Envelop tool to predict and avoid regions of instability 
•  Real time range limiter on learning state space 
•  Real time range limiter on input space 
•  Real time stability/convergence monitor with recovery logic if: 
 Stability/convergence is observed to have failed 
 Stability/convergence cannot be assured due to observed 
violation of assumptions or constraints 
 Computational resource margins are observed to be violated 
3 Assure adaptive 
algorithm actively 
controls only when 
appropriate 
Activities 
• Development activities for this system objective are covered in 
row 1 above 
 
Techniques  
• Use of engage/disengage mechanisms: 
• VHM 
•  Confidence/Envelop tools 
4 Assure no adverse 
safety impact due to 
transients when AS is 
engaged/disengaged 
Activities 
• Development activities for this system objective are covered in 
row 1 above 
 
Techniques 
• Fader functionality for smooth transition of conventional to 
adaptive control 
• Allow adaptation learning prior to AS trigger to eliminate the 
need for forcing function excitation to enable adaptation 
learning. 
5 Assure adaptive 
algorithm does not 
adapt to noise or drift 
away from good 
solution when 
lacking useful 
command/response 
dynamics 
Activities 
• Development activities for this system objective are covered in 
row 1 above 
 
Techniques 
• Use dead band on adaptive system inputs such that learning is 
allowed only when useful command/response dynamics are 
available 
• Use Bayesian reasoning to update the learning parameters only 
in the presence of sufficient excitation 
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The next step in our process is to work through all the objectives of DO-178B/C and, based on 
the principles described and the table above, assign methods and techniques that would provide 
satisfaction of those objectives. We followed the following methodology. 
• List DO-178B/C objectives that are difficult to meet for the example AS we chose 
• Understand what the DO-178B/C objective is asking for and why it’s more difficult to meet 
for this example adaptive system versus a non-adaptive system 
• List the adaptive system system-level functional and safety objectives. These objectives 
will feed the requirements creation process of an implementation 
• List the methods that could be used to provide the evidence necessary for the adaptive 
system system-level objective 
These steps have been followed for our example adaptive system and the results partially 
tabulated in Table 4 of Annex A. This table is presently incomplete. There remain some 
objectives for which we were unable to conclude whether there were special difficulties meeting 
DO-178C and therefore it remains for further work to complete this step. Note that in this table, 
we have merged objectives so that they do not appear in the table in numerical order. 
In our table development, we have emphasized the system-level use of mathematical models and 
MBD to describe (i.e. specify) the complete system behavior in a form suitable for analysis. We 
have also emphasized the system and software level use of FM (and other FM-like techniques) to 
enable proofs of system safety and performance properties and to explore the full state space of 
the adaptive system within feasible simulation times - at least within the veracity of the 
mathematical description and the models. 
Lastly, in order to bound the analysis problem further, we suggest that the use of equivalence 
classes is a possible means for classifying real numbered parameter and I/O variables into a finite 
and possibly small number of subsets. Establishing equivalence classes requires detailed 
knowledge of the application domain and target architecture. 
5 Aspects of Tool Qualification for Adaptive Systems 
Our recommended approach to software verification of adaptive systems utilizes MBD and FM 
tools. We do not envisage that there is any need to amend the guidance provided in the tool 
qualification section of DO-178C or of the tool qualification supplement DO-330. 
6 Recommendations 
The summary recommendation is that for the safe use and successful certification of adaptive 
systems a three step strategy of 1) a safety assessment to create a structured, objective safety case 
followed by 2) system design activities to create the corresponding safety requirements and 3) 
software design assurance using the latest standards. These steps must be supported by 
mathematically based formal or similar methods and model based design techniques. This 
approach is fully consistent with the current regulatory and standards framework. We caution 
that not all the necessary analysis and modeling tools are presently available and therefore 
further work is required before such an approach can be applied in a practical application. 
We break this down into a number of more detailed recommendations. These are classified as 
validation and verification recommendations. Although we have focused on one particular 
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adaptive system type, these recommendations are likely to be applicable to a wider variety of 
systems. 
6.1 Recommendations for Adaptive System Safety and Functional Requirements 
Derivation and Validation 
We recommend the following steps for the creation and validation of system functional and 
safety requirements. 
• Derive system safety objectives that are adaptive system application domain specific by the 
construction a structured, objective, evidence based safety case. The system level 
properties that need to exist essentially form the basis of a safety case. Certification of 
adaptive systems depends on both a system safety case (i.e., formal safety claims, 
arguments & evidence) in addition to system and software design assurance 
• Derive system level properties that satisfy the safety objectives to assure an acceptable 
level of safety. Such properties will drive constraints on the system design 
• Derive system requirements from system safety properties and objectives. Safety properties 
should be specified for; 
o When adaptation may be engaged (triggering) 
o Allowable learned state-space, implying that each learned parameter value be 
constrained to a known and verifiable range 
o Detection and fall-back if they exceed the allowable range, i.e. response when 
constraints are violated 
• Embed system level properties and requirements in computer models suitable for 
automated analysis with qualified tools that can be further decomposed and passed down to 
the verification processes 
• We recommend the use of ARP-4754A and DO-178C and supplements 
• We recommend that ARP-4761 be updated to include a include a structured, evidence 
based safety case methodology 
New regulatory policy instruments are needed to invoke DO-178C and an updated ARP-4761. 
6.2 Recommendations for Adaptive System Requirements Verification 
The verification process of the system level functional and safety requirements and the resulting 
derived requirements can be summarized by the following steps. 
• We recommend that MBD techniques incorporating mathematical models with a well 
defined syntax and semantics should be used. This provides well defined input to 
subsequent analysis tools. The mathematical model should express requirements for safety 
properties e.g. controllability, overshoot, stability, convergence in our example AS 
• The system behavior should be represented by discrete-time mathematical models if the 
implementation will be a digital system 
• FM (and other FM-like techniques) or similar methods should be used to verify 
requirements (aka ‘behavior’). These methods are needed because; 
o Learned state space is too rich to adequately test, or for test to provide adequate 
coverage assurance 
o They allow construction of verification test cases and predict expected test results 
o They can provide proof of system safety and performance properties 
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o Allow to explore the full state space within feasible simulation times 
• The use of DO-178C and supplements is necessary. DO-178B is inadequate to provide 
sufficient software design assurance 
• A multi-layered verification methodology will be necessary, involving all of the available 
techniques i.e. test, inspection and analysis (simulation) 
• Need to ensure the system/safety properties (that form the basis of the safety case) remain 
intact during software requirements development and implementation. This implies 
traceability up and down the requirements and verification hierarchy 
• The certification process will need to place increased reliance on some compliant but non-
traditional means of compliance with certain DO-178C objectives, i.e. more reliance on 
verification by analysis, simulation and formal proofs of correctness rather than test 
o Accept analysis and inspection based verification results for partial certification 
credit 
o Use of outputs from the system processes 
o Use of system analytical models as software requirements 
o Use of system analytical models to perform software verification 
7 Future Adaptive Systems Certification Research Needs 
We have identified some gaps in methods and techniques that appear to be necessary to be able 
to perform the steps identified above. 
• A new technique is needed, analogous to conventional equivalency classes, to classify the 
learned state spaces into a finite (and possibly small) number of equivalence regions or 
ranges to make verification manageable 
• A new technique is needed, analogous to structural coverage analysis, to adapt the current 
notion of structural coverage to measure coverage completeness of the learned state space 
• Further work is needed to complete the table in Annex A. In particular, it is still necessary 
to determine whether additional V&V methods and activities or system level constraints 
are needed to meet the DO-178C objectives as yet unaddressed 
• We suggest that there be a study of the mapping of available MBD and FM tools to the AS 
application domain to identify capability and qualification gaps. In particular, there are 
presently capability gaps in showing in-target object code conformance to HLR and low 
level requirements (LLR) and in showing worst case execution time (WCET) objectives are 
met 
• ARP-4761 presently provides only limited and incomplete guidance on the construction of 
structured, evidence based safety cases. We suggest that an update to this standard is 
needed 
• Because of the specialized nature of FM and MBD techniques, these abilities are not well 
diffused into the developer community. We recommend that a more formalized process 
map be developed along with supporting user guides 
• We recommend that the methodology we have outlined be demonstrated on an actual AS 
application and implementation. The application should be well defined and have the 
supporting mathematical models and code available that are readily translatable into 
FM/MBD constructs and be amenable to all levels of verification up to and including flight 
test, e.g. the L1 controller 
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8 Conclusions 
We view the software design assurance problem for adaptive systems to be principally one of 
how to develop correct and complete requirements that define the necessary system functional 
and safety properties for safe use. These properties need to be established primarily by analysis. 
We do not think that certification of an adaptive system can be accomplished using a software 
design assurance methodology that is based principally on test since the test difficulty is 
insuperable unless guided by analysis. A set of system safety properties must first be specified 
and then design requirements and constraints must be imposed at the system level so that the 
safety properties are first assured by design and then passed down to the software design 
assurance process (DO-178C and supplements) for verification to show that they are 
implemented correctly. The verification of requirements can be accomplished by the use of FM 
and MBD system and software design and verification techniques as are currently envisaged by 
DO-178C and supplements. The methods we suggest are within the scope of the current 14CFR 
regulatory framework and no major change need be contemplated.  An update to ARP-4761 to 
include a structured, evidence based safety case methodology and inclusion of this within the 
current framework is suggested. The principle compliance methodology changes we suggest are 
1) attaching more emphasis to the system and safety development processes through the 
construction of a structured, evidence based safety case and 2) placing more reliance on system 
and software analysis using FM and MDB or similar techniques and less on test for gaining 
certification credit. 
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9 Annex A 
Table 4 – DO-178B/C Objectives Applied to Adaptive Systems (developed with exemplar adaptive flight control system in mind) 
DO-178B/C 
Objective/ 
Section 
Objective 
Description 
What is the Intent of 
178B/C Objective(s)? 
[Ref: primarily DO-248C] 
Why is the 178B/C Objective 
Difficult to Satisfy (for Chosen 
AS Example)? 
Activities & Techniques Used To Satisfy 
178B/C Objective  
(may involve use of system level 
properties) 
A-2 Software 
Development 
Process 
• Systematic 
requirements and 
design decomposition 
• Complete capture of 
software behavior 
    
A-2.1, A-2.4 High-level and low-
level requirements 
are developed. 
• Capture of high-level 
and low-level 
requirements 
• Difficulty ensuring that system 
level stability and convergence 
properties are retained as the 
requirements are decomposed 
 
• The learned state space varies 
based on operating 
environment history. This can 
increase the difficulty in 
decomposing requirements to 
the next lower level that define 
complete software behavior 
(e.g., Sys > HLR > LLR > 
Source) with no unintended 
functionality 
 
• Difficulty assessing impact of 
derived software requirements 
on AS system safety (joint 
with systems and safety). 
Activities 
• Decompose system level requirements 
to develop software requirements and 
code such that: 
 System safety properties are 
retained through implementation 
 System safety assumptions and 
constraints enforceable by 
software are satisfied by software 
requirements and implementation 
• System defined runtime monitors are 
satisfied by software requirements and 
implementation 
• Generate high-credibility evidence of 
compliance with next higher level of 
requirements 
 
Techniques 
• Reuse system level analytical models 
as software requirements (i.e., take 
software credit for system process 
outputs) 
A-2.2, A-2.5 Derived high-level 
and low-level 
requirements are 
defined. 
• Capture of all derived 
requirements 
 
• Ensure safety analysis is 
not compromised by 
improper implementation 
of safety-related 
requirements or 
introduction of new 
behavior not envisioned 
by the safety analysis 
A-2.6 Source Code is 
developed. 
• Develop source code 
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• Apply software-level formal method 
techniques (e.g., model checking, 
compositional verification, static 
analysis, program synthesis, runtime 
analysis) to ensure: 
 System level stability & 
convergence properties are 
retained in the software 
requirements and implementation 
 System level assumptions & 
constraints allocated to software 
are properly decomposed and 
implemented 
A-2.7 Executable Object 
Code is produced 
and integrated in 
the target computer. 
 •  No more difficult   
A-3, A-4, A-
5, A-6, A-7 
Software 
Verification 
Process 
• Apply layers of 
verification 
• Ensure detection and 
removal of errors early 
in the development 
processes 
    
A-3 Verification of 
Software 
Requirements 
Process 
• Ensure correct, 
consistent high-level 
requirements 
• Ensure full 
implementation of 
system requirements 
(completeness) 
    
A-4 Verification of 
Software Design 
Process 
• Ensure correct, 
consistent low-level 
requirements 
• Ensure full 
    
Regulatory Considerations for Adaptive Systems Page 25 
implementation of HLR 
(completeness) 
A-5 Verification of 
Software Coding 
Process 
• Ensure correct, 
consistent source code 
• Ensure full 
implementation of LLR 
(completeness) 
    
Compliance, 
Compatibility 
 
A-3.1, A-4.1, 
A-4.8,  A-5.1, 
A-5.2, A-5.8 
• Software high-
level 
requirements 
comply with 
system 
requirements 
 
 
 
 
 
• Low-level 
requirements 
comply with 
high-level 
requirements 
 
• Software 
architecture is 
compatible with 
high-level 
requirements 
 
• Source Code 
complies with 
low-level 
requirements 
 
• Ensure functional, 
performance and safety-
related systems 
requirements are 
satisfied 
 
• Ensure derived HLR are 
justified and correctly 
defined 
 
• Ensure HLR are satisfied 
 
• Ensure derived LLR 
requirements are justified 
and correctly defined 
 
 
• Ensure software 
architecture does not 
conflict with HLRs 
 
 
 
 
• Ensure the Source Code 
is accurate and complete 
with respect to LLRs 
 
• Difficulty verifying (via 
reviews) that system level 
stability and convergence 
properties remain intact 
through decomposition and 
implementation. 
 
• Difficulty verifying (via 
reviews) that system & safety 
requirements are decomposed 
into HLR & LLR correctly and 
implemented in source code 
correctly 
 
 
• Difficulty verifying (via 
reviews) that HLR, LLR and 
source code capture the 
complete evolving AS 
software behavior 
Activities 
• Verify that the software requirements 
and code: 
 Exhibit system safety properties 
 Satisfy system safety assumptions 
and constraints allocated to 
software 
 Satisfy runtime monitor next 
higher level requirements    
• Generate high-credibility evidence of 
compliance with next higher level of 
requirements 
 
Techniques 
• Apply software-level formal method 
techniques (e.g., model checking, 
compositional verification, static 
analysis, program synthesis, runtime 
analysis) to ensure: 
 System level stability & 
convergence properties are 
retained in the software 
requirements and implementation 
 System level assumptions & 
constraints allocated to software 
are properly decomposed and 
implemented 
Regulatory Considerations for Adaptive Systems Page 26 
• Source Code 
complies with 
software 
architecture 
 
 
 
• Parameter Data 
Item File is 
correct and 
complete. 
• Ensure no undocumented 
functionality 
 
• Ensure Source Code 
matches architecture data 
flow and control flow 
 
• Ensure HLR are satisfied 
with respect to parameter 
data item file (e.g., 
database) 
Accuracy, 
Consistency 
 
A-3.2, A-4.2,  
A-4.9,  A-5.6 
• High-level 
requirements 
are accurate and 
consistent. 
 
• Low-level 
requirements 
are accurate and 
consistent. 
 
• Software 
architecture is 
consistent. 
 
 
• Source Code is 
accurate and 
consistent. 
• HLRs are accurate, 
unambiguous, 
sufficiently detailed, 
consistent 
 
 
• LLRs are accurate, 
unambiguous, 
sufficiently detailed, 
consistent 
 
 
• Ensure correct 
relationship exists 
between the components 
of the software 
architecture 
 
• Ensure Source Code is 
correct and consistent 
with respect to stack 
usage, fixed point 
arithmetic overflow and 
resolution, resource 
• Difficulty verifying (via 
reviews) accuracy & 
consistency attributes 
 
• AS learned state space makes 
it more difficult to determine 
and verify worst case critical 
computer resource usage and 
margins (memory, throughput, 
WCET etc). 
Activities 
• Verify that the software requirements 
and code: 
 Are accurate & consistent with 
respect to system safety properties 
 Are accurate & consistent with 
respect to system safety 
assumptions and constraints 
allocated  to software  
 Properly implement system 
defined computational resource 
constraints and monitors 
 
Techniques 
• Apply software-level formal method 
techniques (e.g., model checking, 
compositional verification, static 
analysis, program synthesis, runtime 
analysis). 
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contention, worst-case 
execution timing, 
exception handling, use 
of uninitialized variables 
or constants, unused 
variables or constants, 
and data corruption due 
to task or interrupt 
conflicts. 
Compatibility 
with Target 
 
A-3.3, A-4.3,  
A-4.10 
• High-level 
requirements 
are compatible 
with target 
computer. 
 
• Low-level 
requirements 
are compatible 
with target 
computer. 
 
• Software 
architecture is 
compatible with 
target computer. 
• Ensure compatibility 
with hardware (e.g., 
resource utilization) 
• AS learned state space makes 
it more difficult to determine 
and verify worst case critical 
computer resource usage and 
margins (memory, 
throughput/WCET, etc). 
Activities 
• Verify that the software requirements 
and code properly implement system 
defined computational resource 
constraints and runtime monitors 
 
Techniques 
• Apply software-level formal method 
techniques (e.g., model checking, 
compositional verification, static 
analysis, program synthesis, runtime 
analysis). 
Verifiability 
 
A-3.4, A-4.4,  
A-4.11, A-5.3 
• High-level 
requirements 
are verifiable. 
 
• Low-level 
requirements 
are verifiable. 
 
• Software 
architecture is 
• Ensure HLRs can be 
verified 
 
 
 
• Ensure LLRs can be 
verified 
 
 
 
• Difficulty assessing if HLR, 
LLR, source code can be 
verified (by test) for all AS 
configurations. 
 
• Difficulty verifying HLR, 
LLR, source code produce 
deterministic (predicable) 
behavior 
Activities 
• Identify test and non-test verification 
techniques for requirements, 
architecture and source code. 
 
Techniques 
• Select appropriate software-level 
formal method techniques (e.g., model 
checking, compositional verification, 
static analysis, program synthesis, 
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verifiable. 
 
 
 
• Source Code is 
verifiable. 
• Ensure architecture can 
be verified 
 
• Ensure architecture is 
deterministic and 
predicable 
 
• Ensure source code can 
be verified 
runtime analysis). 
 
Notes: 
• 1) Software aspects of certification of 
AS will likely require a greater 
reliance on verification by analysis or 
simulation for objectives related to 
verification by test. 
• 2) Our chosen AS is deterministic 
given fully defined initial conditions 
(including learned state space values). 
Conformance 
to Standards 
 
A-3.5, A-4.5,  
A-4.12, A-5.4 
• High-level 
requirements 
conform to 
standards. 
 
• Low-level 
requirements 
conform to 
standards. 
 
• Software 
architecture 
conforms to 
standards. 
 
• Source Code 
conforms to 
standards. 
• Ensure HLRs are 
consistent with HLR 
standards 
 
 
 
• Ensure LLRs are 
consistent with design 
standards 
 
 
 
• Ensure architecture is 
consistent with design 
standards 
 
 
• Ensure Source Code is 
consistent with coding 
standards 
• Might not be more difficult for 
AS 
  
Traceability 
 
A-3.6, A-4.6, 
A-5.5 
• High-level 
requirements 
are traceable to 
system 
System requirements trace to 
HLR: 
• Ensure HLRs fulfill 
system requirements 
• Difficulty verifying that trace 
demonstrates complete 
requirements decomposition 
and implementation all 
Activities 
• Verify that the software requirements 
and code: 
 Exhibit system safety properties 
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requirements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Low-level 
requirements 
are traceable to 
high-level 
requirements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Source Code is 
traceable to 
low-level 
requirements. 
• Ensure all the system 
requirements (including 
safety requirements) 
allocated to software are 
incorporated in the 
HLRs. 
HLR trace to system 
requirements: 
• Identification of 
functionality not 
explicitly required by 
system requirements 
• Ensure that derived 
HLRs are captured, 
justified and fed back to 
safety process 
HLR trace to LLR: 
• Ensure LLRs fulfill 
HLRs 
 
LLR trace to HLR: 
• Identification of 
functionality not 
explicitly required by 
HLRs 
• Ensure that derived 
LLRs are captured, 
justified and fed back to 
safety process 
LLR trace to Source Code: 
• Ensure Source Code 
fulfill LLRs 
 
Source code trace to LLR: 
• Expose any source code 
functionality (intended or 
intended functionality (i.e. 
complete behavior of AS) 
 
• Difficulty verifying that the 
trace demonstrates absence of 
unintended functionality 
 Satisfy system safety assumptions 
and constraints allocated to 
software 
 Satisfy runtime monitor next 
higher level requirements 
 
Techniques 
• Apply software-level formal method 
techniques (e.g., model checking, 
compositional verification, static 
analysis, program synthesis, runtime 
analysis) to ensure: 
 System level stability & 
convergence properties are 
retained in the software 
requirements and implementation 
 System level assumptions & 
constraints allocated to software 
are properly decomposed and 
implemented 
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unintended) that is 
unsupported by the LLRs 
• Ensure unintended 
functionality is removed 
Algorithm 
Accuracy 
 
A-3.7, A-4.7 
• Algorithms are 
accurate for 
HLR 
 
• Algorithms are 
accurate for 
LLR 
• Ensure accuracy and 
behavior of HLR 
algorithms 
 
• Ensure accuracy and 
behavior of LLR 
algorithms 
• Difficulty verifying (via 
reviews) that system level 
stability and convergence 
properties are retained through 
requirements decomposition 
and implementation. 
Activities 
• Verify that the software requirements 
and code: 
 Have accurate algorithms with 
respect to system safety properties 
 Have accurate algorithms with 
respect to system safety 
assumptions and constraints 
allocated to software  
 Have accurate algorithms with 
respect to runtime monitors  
 
Techniques 
• Apply software-level formal method 
techniques (e.g., model checking, 
compositional verification, static 
analysis, program synthesis, runtime 
analysis). 
Partitioning 
Integrity 
 
A-4.13 
Software 
partitioning 
integrity is 
confirmed. 
• Ensure partitioning 
breaches are prevented 
or isolated 
• Possibly no more difficult for 
AS 
  
Completeness, 
Correctness 
 
A-5.7 
Output of software 
integration process 
is complete and 
correct. 
• Ensure results of the 
integration process are 
complete and correct 
• Possibly no more difficult for 
AS 
  
A-5.9 (Verification 
coverage. 
Combined with A-
7.3, A-7.4) 
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A-6 Software Testing 
Process 
• Ensure executable 
object code satisfies 
HLR and LLR 
• Ensure executable 
object code is robust 
  
A-6.1, A-6.3 • Executable 
Object Code 
(EOC) complies 
with high-level 
requirements. 
 
• EOC complies 
with low-level 
requirements. 
• Ensure EOC satisfies 
HLRs for normal range 
inputs 
 
 
 
 
• Ensure EOC satisfies 
LLRs for normal range 
inputs 
• Difficulty developing normal 
range test cases for all possible 
input space and learned state 
space 
 
• Difficulty developing adequate 
set of robustness test cases to 
expose unintended 
functionality 
• Difficulty assuring software 
dynamic stability and 
convergence by test for all AS 
learned states 
 
• Verification by test is likely 
inadequate to show EOC is 
correct for all possible AS 
behavior 
Note: 
• Software aspects of certification of AS 
will likely require a greater reliance on 
verification by analysis or simulation 
for objectives related to verification by 
test. 
• Certification process will likely need 
to allow for the use of multi-layered 
verification methods. 
 
Activities 
• Verify that the EOC: 
 Exhibits system safety properties 
 Satisfies system safety 
assumptions and constraints 
allocated to software 
 Satisfies runtime monitor 
requirements    
• Generate high-credibility evidence of 
EOC compliance 
 
Techniques 
• Apply software-level formal method 
techniques (e.g., model checking, 
compositional verification, static 
analysis, program synthesis, runtime 
analysis) to ensure: 
 System level stability & 
convergence properties are 
retained in the software 
A-6.2, A-6.4 • Executable 
Object Code is 
robust with 
high-level 
requirements. 
 
• Executable 
Object Code is 
robust with 
low-level 
requirements. 
• Ensure EOC is robust 
such that it can continue 
to operate correctly 
despite abnormal inputs 
and conditions 
 
• Ensure failure detection 
and recovery capabilities 
are effective and robust 
in mitigating hazards 
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requirements and implementation 
 System level assumptions & 
constraints allocated to software 
are properly decomposed and 
implemented 
• Apply formal method techniques to 
develop normal/robust test cases and 
expected results for input space and 
learned state space. 
• Monte Carlo simulations 
• Need an analytical method for 
establishing "equivalence classes" for 
learned state space. 
• Continuity-based equivalency class 
partitioning 
A-6.5 Executable Object 
Code is compatible 
with target 
computer. 
• Ensure compatibility 
with hardware (e.g., 
resource utilization) 
 
• Ensure detection of 
target-related errors or 
compiler target-specific 
errors 
• Learned state space makes it 
more difficult to test worst 
case resource utilization. 
Activities 
• Verify that the software requirements 
and code properly implement system 
defined computational resource 
constraints and runtime monitors 
 
Techniques 
• Apply software-level formal method 
techniques (e.g., model checking, 
compositional verification, static 
analysis, program synthesis, runtime 
analysis). 
A-7 Verification of Verification 
Process 
• Ensure thorough 
testing of the EOC 
 
• Ensure completeness of 
HLR and LLR testing 
requirements based test 
(RBT) coverage 
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• Ensure completeness of 
HLRs and LLRs 
(Structural coverage) 
 
• Ensure unintended 
functionality is exposed 
(Structural coverage) 
A-7.1 Test procedures are 
correct. 
• Ensure test cases were 
accurately developed 
into test procedures and 
expected results 
• Difficulty predicting correct 
expected results covering the 
input space, learning state 
space and dynamic states (e.g., 
converging, converged). 
Activities 
• Develop test/analysis/simulation cases 
into test/analysis/simulation 
procedures 
 
Techniques 
• Apply formal method techniques to 
develop normal/robust test cases and 
expected results for input space and 
learned state space. 
A-7.2 Test results are 
correct and 
discrepancies 
explained. 
• Ensure test results are 
correct and that 
discrepancies between 
actual and expected 
results are explained 
• Possibly no more difficult for 
AS 
  
A-7.3, A-7.4, 
A-5.9 
Test coverage of 
high-level 
requirements is 
achieved. 
 
Test coverage of 
low-level 
requirements is 
achieved. 
 
Verification of 
Parameter Data 
• Ensure completeness of 
HLR test cases 
 
 
• Ensure completeness of 
LLR test cases 
 
 
• Ensure completeness of 
verification with respect 
to Parameter Data Item 
File (e.g., database) 
• Difficulty developing normal 
range test cases for all AS 
behavior 
 
• Difficulty developing adequate 
set of  robustness test cases to 
expose unintended 
functionality 
 
• Difficulty assuring software 
dynamic stability and 
convergence by test for 
Note: 
• Software aspects of certification of AS 
will likely require a greater reliance on 
verification by analysis or simulation 
for objectives related to verification by 
test. 
• Certification process will likely need 
to allow for the use of multi-layered 
verification methods. Test coverage 
trace may need to be expanded to test, 
analysis, and simulation coverage 
trace. 
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Item File is 
achieved. 
elements learned state space and input 
space.  
 
Activities 
• Ensure complete 
test/analysis/simulation coverage trace 
 
Techniques 
• Augment testing with software-level 
formal method techniques (e.g., model 
checking, compositional verification, 
static analysis, program synthesis, 
runtime analysis) to ensure: 
 System level stability & 
convergence properties are 
retained in the software 
requirements and implementation 
 System level assumptions & 
constraints allocated to software 
are properly decomposed and 
implemented 
• Monte Carlo simulations 
A-7.5 Test coverage of 
software structure 
(modified 
condition/decision) 
is achieved. 
• Ensure completeness of 
HLRs and LLRs 
 
• Ensure unintended 
functionality is exposed 
• Ensure unreachable code 
is exposed 
 
• Ensure that the compiler 
does not inject 
functionality that was not 
specified in the source 
code 
 
• Ensure requirements are 
• Structural coverage analysis 
insufficient to measure 
completeness of 
test/analysis/simulation of all 
possible input space and 
learned state space. 
Activities 
• Ensure complete decision/statement 
coverage 
 
Techniques 
• Static analysis tools. Rely on FM 
proofs to verify all program path 
executions 
• Would still not be adequate for 
MC/DC or decisions unrelated to 
branching. 
 Need an analytical method to 
measure verification coverage 
completeness of learned state 
space. 
A-7.6 Test coverage of 
software structure 
(decision coverage) 
is achieved. 
A-7.7 Test coverage of 
software structure 
(statement 
coverage) is 
achieved. 
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sufficiently detailed 
(similar decision 
structure as the code) 
A-7.8 Test coverage of 
software structure 
(data coupling and 
control coupling) is 
achieved. 
• Ensure test coverage 
with respect to the 
software architecture 
(specifically the data 
flow between software 
components and the 
control of software 
component execution) 
 
• Ensure a sufficient 
amount of 
hardware/software 
integration testing and/or 
software integration 
testing to verify that the 
software architecture is 
correctly implemented 
with respect to the 
requirements 
A-7.9 Verification of 
additional code that 
cannot be traced to 
Source Code is 
achieved. 
• Ensure that the EOC is 
evaluated for any 
functionality added by 
the compiler 
 
• Ensure that compiler 
added functionality has 
no safety impact 
12.2 Tool Qualification • Ensure tool provides 
confidence at least 
equivalent to that of the 
process(es) eliminated, 
• Difficulty with tool 
qualification of development 
tools (TQL-1 through TQL-4) 
for the auto generation of 
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reduced or automated adaptive source or object code. 
 
• Difficulty with tool 
qualification of verification 
tools (TQL-4 or TQL-5) 
intended to simulate all 
operating conditions or invoke 
complete (evolving) software 
behavior. 
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